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O f late, there has been a great deal of interest in the ability of lawenforcement agencies to place wiretaps on the Internet.  Whilethere are certainly legitimate reasons for wanting this ability, it is an
area that is fraught with technical difficulty and legal ambiguity.  In light of
these problems, new legal and technical approaches to wiretapping are in
order.  
In this article, we examine wiretapping problems from several perspec-
tives—statutory, jurisdictional, and technical—and suggest paths to mini-
mizing those problems.  
First, and in some sense the simplest, are problems with current statutes.
While some of these can be fixed by legislative action, others raise deeper
issues.  Second are jurisdictional problems; Internet routing systems can
make it unclear who has the right to tap a call and under what circum-
stances.  Third, the very nature of Internet communications introduces
complex technical problems.  Packet-switched networks are inherently
much harder to monitor than conventional phone lines.  When looked at
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in combination, these factors highlight an overall com-
plexity that makes the practice of Internet wiretapping
a dubious undertaking. 
Before discussing legal issues, it is important to
understand, on a basic level, how the Internet works.
The Internet is a packet-switching network; that is, a
stream of data sent from one computer to another is
split up into small pieces known as packets, and each
packet is transmitted independently.  Because each
packet travels independently, all packets must be
labeled with their source and destination addresses.
These are known as IP (Internet Protocol) addresses
and are not normally seen by end users.  
Packets are transported over the Internet by a series
of hops between devices known as routers, which serve
as intermediate network nodes.  A router looks at a
packet’s destination address and forwards it to the
appropriate neighboring router.  The most appropriate
neighbor is determined dynamically by the routers—
they regularly exchange information about the net-
work topology by means of routing protocols.  If two or
more neighbors are equally good, a router will choose
a neighbor so as to balance the load between alternate
paths.
Each ISP (Internet service provider) operates its own
network of routers.  ISPs talk to each other via private
links and at public exchange points where many ISPs
meet.  These interconnections, especially the public
exchange points, are often overloaded, and the result-
ing congestion is a major source of data transmission
errors, known as dropped packets. 
There are no guarantees of packet delivery on the
Internet—packets may be dropped, duplicated, dam-
aged, or reordered along the way.  All users who require
reliable packet delivery must make arrangements for
error detection and correction.  Of course, most do,
usually by using TCP (Transmission Control Protocol)
in conjunction with IP.  TCP detects damaged or
dropped packets and sends acknowledgements back to
the sending system when good packets are received.  If
the sending system does not receive the proper
acknowledgements, it will retransmit the missing pieces
until they arrive intact.  
Applications that do their own retransmissions or
that do not need all of the functionality of TCP some-
times use UDP (User Datagram Protocol).  UDP is con-
siderably lower in overhead and is often used for simple
query/response applications.  
Internet Addressing
In general, ISPs assign IP addresses to their clients on
a dynamic basis.  This is partly because addresses are in
short supply and partly because IP addresses need to be
flexible to reflect the current topology of the network.
Consumers who use dial-up modems can end up con-
necting to the Internet through different routers
(sometimes in other cities), depending on the load on
their ISP’s local modem pool. 
Internet servers tend to have reasonably constant IP
addresses, and they always have well-known names.
These names are mapped into IP addresses via the DNS
(Domain Name System).  Apart from Web servers, ISPs
run a number of servers on behalf of their users,
notably e-mail and netnews machines.  These servers
are often replicated to provide load-sharing and relia-
bility, and the duplicates are often geographically
remote from the primaries.  Similarly, corporate servers
are often connected to more than one ISP, each of
which could assign its own IP addresses to the corpo-
rate servers.   
Internet connections are between pairs of systems,
but performing user-requested services may involve
intermediate systems.  Consider, for example, e-mail
sent between two typical home users.  The mail is ini-
tially sent from the first home computer to the ISP’s
outgoing mail gateway.  From there the mail is sent to
the receiving ISP’s incoming mail gateway, and from
there it may be forwarded to a mail repository server.
Finally, the receiving user dials in to the ISP, connects
to the mail repository, and downloads the mail.  At least
three, and probably four or more, separate TCP con-
nections are involved, as well as several DNS lookups.
The multiplicity of systems involved in carrying out
even simple requests is at the root of some of the legal
complexities. 
Any legal wiretapping has to be done in accordance
with statutory authority.  While in some sense this is an
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easy problem—the appropriate legislative bodies can
simply enact any necessary laws—the problems of defi-
nition are significant.  In particular, concepts familiar
to law enforcement in the traditional telephony world
do not necessarily translate easily to the Internet.
Statutory Considerations
The basic framework of U.S. wiretap law was adopted
in 1968 as Title III of the Omnibus Safe Streets and
Crime Control Act.  (As a consequence, law enforce-
ment personnel often refer to court orders permitting
wiretaps as “Title III orders.”)  The law was significant-
ly amended in 1986 by the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act (ECPA), the primary thrust of which was to
add the anti-eavesdropping protections—and the wire-
tap permissions—from the voice world to the data
world.
As the law stands now, wiretrap permissions are gov-
erned by four major sections of statute:  18 USC 3121
(pen registers and trap-and-trace devices); 18 USC 2510
(interception of communications); 18 USC 2701
(access to stored communications); and 50 USC 1801
(foreign intelligence surveillance). 
The pen register statute poses the greatest statutory
problem.  Pen registers are devices that record what
telephone numbers are dialed from monitored lines,
while trap-and-trace devices record the phone num-
bers that dial to a monitored line.  These concepts were
once well defined, but they pose considerable prob-
lems when extended to the Internet.  
For example, what are the Internet equivalents to
dialing and dialed numbers?  The most obvious answer
is the IP addresses in each packet, which represent the
actual endpoints of the communication.  But these
endpoints are likely to be either uninteresting or well
beyond the scope of a reasonable warrant.  With a typ-
ical e-mail server system, all that could be learned by
monitoring an end user’s line is that the user is sending
or receiving e-mail; the identity of the user is not dis-
closed.  Similarly, putting the monitor at the ISP would
reveal that a customer of one ISP was corresponding
with a customer of another ISP.  Neither party’s identi-
ty would be revealed by monitoring at this level.  
A more useful answer, from the perspective of the
information to be learned, would be to monitor the
actual e-mail addresses used.  This, too, is problematic,
for a number of reasons.  First, e-mail addresses are not
authenticated.  It’s quite easy to supply false source
addresses by simply changing the mailer’s configura-
tion.  This is a strong argument against trap-and-trace
monitoring based on the sender’s address.  Similarly,
destination addresses can be fabricated, and in this
case, delivery failure notification would be e-mailed to
the sender, and may not be detected by the monitor.
A more compelling problem is that the necessary
user information may not exist, or it may be in the
wrong place.  E-mail sent via a “bcc:” option does not
contain the recipient’s name in the mail header lines,
and typical mail retrieval protocols do not distinguish
between mail header lines and mail content.  Indeed,
that lack of differentiation raises the most serious tech-
nical issue.  
Internet standards have distinguished between the
“envelope” and the “contents” of e-mail since at least
1982.  In fact, those precise words are used.  The enve-
lope contains the instructions to the mail system about
the sender and the recipients. With a pen register war-
rant, is it legal to look beyond the envelope?  And if it
were legal to look, the content in header lines poses
two further problems.  First, the information in a head-
er does not necessarily relate to the actual sender or
recipients of the mail.  It is quite easy to manipulate a
header to list addresses for people who will never see
the mail, leading to the possibility of innocent parties
being dragged into an investigation.  Second, header
lines may reveal important information about parties
not covered by the court order—the addresses of other
correspondents of the sender—thus going well beyond
the capabilities of a traditional telephone trap-and-
trace device.  That is, if someone sends e-mail to the tar-
get of an Internet trap-and-trace order, the sender’s
identity will be disclosed to the investigators, as intend-
ed by the court order.  But other addresses listed in the
headers will be disclosed as well, despite the lack of any
statute intending this result.  
A final problem to solve is the wording of the statute
itself.  Currently, a pen register is defined as “a device
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which records or decodes electronic or other impulses
which identify the numbers dialed or otherwise trans-
mitted on the telephone line to which such device is
attached.” Similarly, a trap-and-trace device is defined
as “a device which captures the incoming electronic or
other impulses which identify the originating number
of an instrument or device from which a wire or elec-
tronic communication was transmitted.”
Note that both definitions not only specify a tele-
phone line, they specify a “device” or a “line.”  These
concepts do not correspond to an identity, or even an
e-mail account.  At best, the analogs are a computer
and either the access line or the IP address assigned to
the computer.  As noted, however, the latter is subject
to dynamic change and is not particularly useful when
dealing with e-mail. 
The legal authority for full-content wiretap warrants
is more clear.  The ECPA amended the statute to speak
of “electronic communications,” rather than just voice
calls.  Furthermore, the distinctions between IP address
and destination, or between message envelope and
content, are irrelevant; the investigator is entitled to all
traffic.  The difficulty comes in identifying the content
belonging to the targeted user.
Most physical media used to carry Internet traffic are
shared, with the exception (in some cases) of the access
line to a customer’s premises.  That is, the same physi-
cal wire or fiber-optic cable carries traffic to or from
many different parties.  To isolate a particular party’s
packets, it’s necessary to look at the IP addresses.  Is this
sort of examination legal?  
This question leads to questions of jurisdiction—
Who has the right to place a wiretap, and under what
circumstances?  Does the physical presence of a packet
in some particular locale matter?
Packets on the Internet can take a complex path
from source to destination.  This is partly due to the
nature of IP routing, but even more to the complex
relationships among ISPs.  It is rather rare for a con-
versation to stay within a single ISP; just how and where
they interconnect is governed by complex business and
technical considerations.
A few recent experiments by the author make clear
just how nonintuitive routing can be.  In one case, pack-
ets between two towns in North Carolina went via
Atlanta, Georgia.  Packets from the author’s office to
his home, both in New Jersey, went via California.  And
packets from New Jersey to Russia went to New York,
Washington, D.C., and back to New York before finally
heading overseas.
Access to e-mail raises more troubling issues.  As
noted, most e-mail addressed to individuals will reside
on an ISP’s data center, on a mail server, until explicit-
ly retrieved by the recipient.  It is not likely that the data
center will be in the same jurisdiction as either the
sender or the recipient.  What judge has the power to
order access to such messages?
This problem is further complicated for internation-
al traffic.  For example, in one test, traffic from North
Carolina to Costa Rica went via Montreal.  Does that
give Canadian authorities any right to read it?  For his-
torical reasons, the United States is in the middle of
many Internet paths.  Does this give the United States
the right to read such traffic?
Unreliable Packet Switching
Many of the technical problems with wiretapping
stem from the very nature of Internet technology.
Someone who wishes to avoid monitoring can exploit
the complexity of the technology. 
For example, one problem inherent to the Internet
is that of packet stream reassembly.  The individual
packets that make up a message must be recombined at
destination to form a coherent whole, and the rules for
doing this are complicated.  If the process is imple-
mented differently on the monitoring box and the
recipient’s system, the two might see different streams,
especially if the target user attempts to evade the mon-
itor.  For example, consider two packets whose contents
overlap in the final stream.  This is acceptable to TCP,
and in some cases is a normal occurrence; TCP com-
pares the overlapping areas and ignores the duplicate
content.  But what if the two areas differ?  Which pack-
et should the monitor believe?  
An attacker can make the problem even worse by
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exploiting packet lifetimes.  Packets have a finite life-
time, measured in router hops.  The “hop count” is
assigned by the sending system, and each router on the
path subtracts one hop.  If the count reaches zero, the
packet is discarded.  Suppose there is a sequence of
packets containing a login name, a set of backspace
characters, and a different login name.  Which login
name is intended for the recipient?  If the packets all
have the same lifetime, the second one would be used.
But if the backspace characters and second login name
have too short a lifetime, the first name would be used.
Can the monitoring system handle it properly?  Using
purely passive techniques, it is very difficult to tell how
far away a destination is, and simply seeing different
lifetimes on different packets says nothing about
whether or not a destination will receive them. 
Packets to a given destination can take different
paths through the Internet.  This can reflect topology
changes or load balancing.  Indeed, even a single com-
puter can use multiple dial-up sessions in parallel to
achieve greater throughput.  A simple monitoring sta-
tion may not be equipped to detect this.  Furthermore,
a very high percentage of paths are asymmetric:  return
traffic does not flow through the same routers as for-
ward traffic.
Even deciding which packets to monitor is difficult.
As noted, consumer machines generally have dynamic
IP addresses.  A monitoring station needs to know what
IP addresses to watch, and that means it has to monitor
the address assignment protocol, which can be difficult
to do.  If the monitoring station misses assignment mes-
sages, it will not begin to monitor the target; if it misses
disconnect messages, it will record someone else’s traf-
fic as well.
In fact, it is sometimes impossible to know what
address is being used by a target.  For example, some
systems use Network Address Translators (NATs) to
dynamically map a group of internal, private addresses
to a few external IP addresses.  Because of the shortage
of IP addresses, some ISPs and many hotels employ
NATs.  A box monitoring a system on the public Inter-
net has no way of learning the actual IP address of a
correspondent system behind an NAT. 
Software Complexity
The preceding description makes it clear that any
monitoring system will of necessity be quite complex.
That complexity carries with it its own risks—the most
important being that complex software is buggy.  It is
generally accepted that the number of bugs in a system
increases roughly as the square of the size of the code,
and while bugs are never good, their consequences can
be especially serious in an Internet wiretapping device. 
The most obvious risk, of course, is that the device
will crash.  In some sense this is not so bad, in that such
a failure is relatively obvious and benign, although it
still represents wasted resources.  More importantly,
reliance on an Internet wiretapping device can divert
investigators from the use of other techniques, and if
the wiretap fails, no information will be gathered, by
any means. 
More subtle failures can have more serious conse-
quences.  Failures to record certain classes of traffic can
easily deceive investigators; both exculpatory and
incriminating evidence can be missed.  Corruption in
recording is worse yet.  Apart from anything else, a
recording that is demonstrably inaccurate is useless at
trial, especially if it contains extraneous traffic.  
But by far the most serious failure mode would be a
takeover of the monitoring box by hostile parties, a sce-
nario that is not at all improbable.  About half of all new
security failures are caused by “buffer overflows.”  If a
buffer overflow were to be found and exploited in an
Internet wiretapping device, the device itself could be
taken over, possibly by the target of the wiretap.  And
the consequences of that—the potential for criminal
control of law enforcement tools—are chilling.
If nothing else, the attacker would be able to learn
the monitoring parameters, and, depending on the
design of the monitoring box, might be able to alter or
erase logs of previously recorded sessions.  Worst of all,
the device—a system that by design is a high-quality
wiretapping unit—could be diverted and used as an
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eavesdropping unit for the attacker. 
We have outlined a number of difficulties involved
with wiretapping on the Internet.  While some of the
problems are very hard to solve, we can address some
issues in a number of respects.
The first approach, of course, is to clarify the statutes.
While the ECPA was a good first try, experience has
shown that it does not match the reality of the Internet.
The problem of pen registers, in particular, is a thorny
one, given the inherent difficulty in determining the
endpoints of the conversation—the target and the tar-
get’s correspondent—in a way that cleanly separates
that information from the content of their communi-
cations. 
A second approach is to push the wiretap as close as
possible to the target.  Much of the trouble arises from
differences between what the user sees and what the
monitoring box sees.  Other problems come from iden-
tifying just which packets belong to the user.  A modem
tap on the physical phone line would finesse many of
these issues; packets on that wire are, by definition, to
or from the user.  Questions of which IP address to
monitor are moot.  Solutions of this nature (placing the
tap near the target) could also be applied to DSL (dig-
ital subscriber line) connections, but not to cable
modems, which are inherently shared. 
Finally, simplifying the task to be performed will sim-
plify the software.  (That is, if the tap is closer to the tar-
get, there are fewer variables to handle with software.
Among other things, it’s much easier to monitor a slow
line than a fast, multiuser cable.)  Software complexity
is the greatest unsolved problem in the computer
industry and is likely to remain so.  To make Internet
wiretaps more accurate and secure, it is critical to limit
vulnerabilities due to software bugs.  Only in this way
can we be confident that both the restrictions and the
authorizations of the law are carried out.
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